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Openness Of cOurts can serve laudable 
purposes, not the least of which are 
transparency of government and court 
systems and access to justice, although 
accounts of the open court principle’s 
meaning, breadth, and underlying pur-
poses have expanded and shifted over 
time. Currently in Canada the adherence 
to the principle has meant presumptive 
access to almost all aspects of court 
cases, including access to personal 
information about parties and witness-
es, encompassing not only information 
contained in court judgments, but also 
information contained in documents 
filed in court offices. Historically, not-
withstanding this presumptive access, 
practical obscurity has protected much 
of this information, in that most people 
will not trouble themselves to physically 
attend court offices in order to review 
records filed there. While the practical 
obscurity generated by having to phys-
ically access court records made it dif-
ficult for the public to interact with and 
understand the law and legal outcomes 
by, for example, imposing a barrier to 
public access to court judgments, it 
also protected privacy by minimizing 
the likelihood of widespread public 
inspection of personal information about 
witnesses and litigants. Moving court 
records online makes those records 
more easily accessible and thereby 
undermines practical obscurity. This 
change offers the benefit of improving 
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La pubLicité des débats de nos tribu-
naux judiciaires peut servir des objectifs 
tout à fait louables, dont la transparence 
du gouvernement et du système judi-
ciaire et l’accès à la justice ne sont pas 
les moindres, même si les analyses de la 
signification, de la portée et des objectifs 
sous-jacents du principe de la publicité 
des débats judiciaires n’ont cessé de 
croître et d’évoluer au fil du temps. À 
l’heure actuelle, au Canada, l’adhésion à 
ce principe implique un accès présumé à 
presque tous les éléments des décisions 
judiciaires, notamment l’accès aux 
renseignements personnels des parties 
et des témoins, ce qui englobe non seule-
ment les renseignements contenus dans 
les décisions judiciaires mais également 
l’information figurant dans les docu-
ments consignés dans les greffes des 
tribunaux. De tout temps, nonobstant 
cet accès présumé, l’obscurité pratique 
a fait en sorte de protéger l’essentiel de 
cette information, dans la mesure où la 
plupart des gens ne feront pas l’effort de 
se déplacer physiquement pour consul-
ter dans les greffes les dossiers qui y 
sont entreposés. Bien que cette obscuri-
té pratique découlant de l’obligation de 
se déplacer pour accéder aux archives 
judiciaires ait pu, en quelque sorte, nuire 
à la compréhension qu’a le public de la 
loi et de l’issue des procédures judi-
ciaires en imposant un certain obstacle 
à l’accès aux décisions judiciaires, elle a 
su du même coup protéger la vie privée 
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public access to law and legal reasoning, 
but in the online context, maintaining a 
default in favour of presumptive access 
could also have devastating effects on 
privacy. Unfettered online access re-
moves the inconveniences and personal 
accountability associated with gaining 
physical access to paper records, not 
only opening up public access to court 
judgments, but also opening up sensitive 
personal information to the voyeuristic 
gaze of the public. We take the position 
that in this context, presumptive access 
to personal information about parties 
and witnesses jeopardizes the funda-
mental human right to privacy without 
substantially contributing to the under-
lying values of the open court principle: 
transparency and access to justice. Ul-
timately, we suggest that mechanisms to 
reintroduce friction into the process of 
gaining access to personal information 
ought to be taken to rebalance the public 
interest in open courts with the public 
interest in the protection of privacy.
des gens en minimisant le possibilité 
d’une inspection publique généralisée 
des renseignements personnels relatifs 
aux témoins et aux parties en litige. Le 
transfert de ces dossiers judiciaires sur 
un support en ligne les rend désormais 
aisément accessibles, ce qui diminue 
d’autant l’obscurité pratique. Ce change-
ment offre certes l’avantage d’améliorer 
l’accès du public au droit et au raisonne-
ment juridique, grâce à l’accès en ligne, 
cependant, le fait de maintenir ce défaut 
en faveur d’un accès présumé pourrait 
également entraîner des conséquences 
négatives sur la vie privée. En effet, un 
accès en ligne inconditionnel et illimité 
supprime, ce faisant, les inconvénients 
et la responsabilité personnelle associés 
à la nécessité de se déplacer physique-
ment pour accéder à des dossiers en 
version papier, non seulement en per-
mettant l’accès aux décisions judiciaires 
mais en offrant qui plus est des rensei-
gnements personnels délicats au regard 
éventuellement voyeur du public. Nous 
sommes d’avis que, dans un tel contexte, 
l’accès présumé à des renseignements 
personnels au sujet des parties et des 
témoins compromet le droit fondamen-
tal de tout un chacun à sa vie privée, 
sans pour autant contribuer de façon 
importante aux valeurs qui sous-tendent 
le principe de la publicité des débats 
judiciaires, soit la transparence et l’accès 
à la justice. En dernier ressort, nous 
recommandons l’adoption de mesures 
rétablissant une forme de « difficulté » 
dans le cadre du processus d’obtention 
d’un accès aux renseignements person-
nels et ce, afin de rééquilibrer l’intérêt 
public à l’accès aux débats judiciaires 
avec l’intérêt public à la protection de la 
vie privée.
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INTRODUCTION
Although there is a long history of commitment to the open court princi-
ple throughout common and civil law systems, the principle has not been 
uniformly conceived of or applied over time. In this paper, we pay particu-
lar attention to one particular shift: although discussion of the open court 
principle initially focused on holding public officials involved in the legal 
process to public account, it has also been used to motivate presumptive 
openness with respect to personal information about parties and witness-
es. As a result, unless restricted by explicit court order or in specific and 
identified types of proceedings (e.g. youth court), the public has access 
to any and all information revealed by or about parties and witnesses 
in court proceedings. This information can include, in addition to one’s 
name, identifying and/or sensitive personal information such as addresses, 
names of children, financial information, social insurance number, and 
details about personal and professional life. Personal information can be 
found not only in court judgments, but also in numerous other kinds of 
documents filed with courts, including but not limited to: affidavits, at-
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tachments to affidavits (such as financial statements), and facta. The de-
fault of presumed accessibility continues even as documents forming part 
of court files move online, where the privacy of litigants and parties is no 
longer protected by the practical obscurity afforded by the requirement of 
physical access to paper documents.1 Presumptive openness in an era of 
online publication could have devastating consequences for privacy, with-
out substantially contributing to the fundamental underlying objective of 
the open court principle: that is, transparency and accountability of the 
justice system. 
There can be no question about the sensitivity of the personal informa-
tion revealed in court documents. Documentation in family law cases, for 
example, regularly includes names, addresses, telephone numbers, dates 
of birth of parties, details about children (e.g. names, ages, etc.), and fi-
nancial account statements.2 Personal injury cases also include significant 
information about the health and health care of litigants. In many cases, 
this information would be subject to protection if collected by other ac-
tors in other contexts. Banks, for example, are not at liberty to release 
sensitive financial information, and health care providers are required to 
protect personal health information. Furthermore, although the account-
ability requirements for public systems (including the Canadian health 
care and educational systems) clearly implicate information about mem-
bers of the public who take part in those systems as patients or students, 
there is no default to openness with respect to personal information in 
these systems — individual health care and student educational records 
are not presumptively open to the public. Thus, in situations other than 
court proceedings where personal information is revealed, the default is 
to protect the privacy of the individuals involved.
This paper explores the justification for the default to openness3 with 
respect to all aspects of court proceedings, including personal information 
regarding parties and witnesses. Our purpose is not to suggest specific 
1 See Arminda Bradford Bepko, “Public Availability or Practical Obscurity: The Debate Over 
Public Access to Court Records on the Internet” (2004) 49 NYL Sch L Rev 967; Nancy S 
Marder, “From ‘Practical Obscurity’ to Web Disclosure: A New Understanding of Public 
Information” (2009) 59 Syracuse L Rev 441. 
2 See Fareen Jamal, “Naming and Shaming in the Family Court”, online: (April 2011) 36:2 
Briefly Speaking 32 <www.issuu.com/ontariobarassociation/docs/brieflyapril2011>.
3 Note that while openness of court records is the default in many jurisdictions, including 
Canada and the US, this policy is not universal. See e.g. James B Jacobs & Elena Larrauri, 
“Are Criminal Convictions a Public Matter? The USA and Spain” (2012) 14:1 Punishment & 
Society 3.
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solutions (which in the online context would necessarily involve collabor-
ation with technology experts), but to highlight in detail the historical and 
contemporary parameters of the issue. We examine the impact of the turn 
towards online accessibility of court records (including judgments, docu-
ments filed with courts, etc.) that makes this issue even more pressing —  
increased access to information from online publication heightens the 
challenge of striking the right balance between the openness necessary to 
facilitate court accountability and transparency, and the privacy interests 
of parties and witnesses.4 We trace some of the key developments in the 
conceptualization of the open court principle and examine the privacy im-
pact of technological changes on access to court records. Ultimately, we 
argue that presumptive public access to court records containing parties’ 
and witnesses’ personal information has always undermined privacy with-
out necessarily serving the underlying purposes of the open court prin-
ciple, and that this is especially true in an era of online publication. We 
therefore recommend improvements to the confidentiality of parties’ and 
witnesses’ personal information in all court records made available online. 
Part I provides a short historical overview of the open court principle, 
considering its stated underlying purposes, as well as its benefits and short-
comings. Part II first examines, more specifically, the aspect of the open 
court principle that defaults in favour of public accessibility of the personal 
information of parties and witnesses. It considers the stated relationship 
of this default to the open court principle itself, as well as the foundation 
upon which exceptions to that default are based. Part III specifically con-
siders the impact of technological changes, including the online access-
ibility of court documents, on the privacy rights of witnesses and parties, 
questioning the consequences of a default in favour of public accessibility 
to parties’ and witnesses’ personal information in terms of the underlying 
purposes of the open court principle. The conclusion highlights the need 
for an alternative model for civil litigation: one that defaults in favour of 
confidentiality of the personal information of witnesses and parties. We 
explore whether such an approach more fairly and equitably achieves the 
underlying objectives of the open court principle: accountability and trans-
parency that encourages public confidence in the justice system, without 
unnecessarily compromising the privacy interests of its participants. 
4 See e.g. Kirk Makin, “Online Tribunal Evidence Leaves Citizens’ Data Open to Abuse”, The 
Globe and Mail (20 August 2008) A5, online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
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I. THE OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE
A. Origins and Underlying Purposes
A commitment to the openness of courts is expressed in a variety of na-
tional and international legal instruments and decisions.5 It has been sug-
gested that the open court principle itself originates in the 1215 Magna 
Carta.6 Although the vast majority of its provisions have been repealed, 
the Magna Carta is valorized as the foundation of democracy in England, 
particularly because it expressed the idea that royalty and non-royalty 
were equally subject to the law.7 King John signed the Magna Carta to buy 
a short-lived peace in the realm by guaranteeing certain rights and liber-
ties to “free men.”8 Chapters 39 and 40 are said to be specifically relevant 
to the open court principle:
39. No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in 
any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by 
the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
40. To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.9 
Others subsequently interpreted the Magna Carta in general and these 
chapters specifically as supporting the assertion of individual rights against 
the exercise of royal authority and universal application of the rule of law. 
As Blackstone put it in his Commentaries of 1765, referring to Sir Edmund 
Coke:
A third subordinate right of every Englishman is that of applying to the 
courts of justice for redress of injuries. Since the law is in England the su-
preme arbiter of every man’s life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must 
at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly administred [sic] 
5 See The Right Honourable Beverly McLachlin, “Courts, Transparency and Public Confi-
dence: To the Better Administration of Justice” (2003) 8:1 Deakin L Rev 1 at 2. 
6 See Suzanne L Abram, “Problems of Contemporaneous Construction in State Constitu-
tional Interpretation” (2000) 38 Brandeis LJ 613 at 614.
7 See Claire Breay & Julian Harrison, “Magna Carta: An Introduction”, British Library, on-
line: <www.bl.uk> (it has also been credited as a foundational symbolic document in the 
creation of other constitutions, including the American Bill of Rights and the United Na-
tions Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948).
8 See ibid (notably, most of the population of England were not “free men” but rather “un-
free” peasants to whom these rights and liberties did not apply).
9 Gerald Murphy, “The Magna Carta (The Great Charter)”, Constitution Society (25 Septem-
ber 1995), online: <www.gutenberg.org>. 
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therein. The emphatical [sic] words of magna carta, spoken in the person of 
the king, who in judgment of law (says sir Edward Coke) is ever present and 
repeating them in all his courts, are these; “nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, 
aut differemus rectum vel justitiam: and therefore every subject,” continues 
the same learned author, “for injury done to him in bonis, in terris, vel persona, 
by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal without any exception, 
may take his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice and right for 
the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and 
speedily without delay.” It were endless to enumerate all the affirmative acts 
of parliament wherein justice is directed to be done according to the law of 
the land: and what that law is, every subject knows; or may know if he pleas-
es: for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge; but is permanent, 
fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of parliament.10 
Blackstone’s analysis connects three fundamental ideals of justice: (i) 
all individuals should have access to courts of justice as a means to resolve 
their disputes; (ii) courts should resolve those disputes by applying the 
same law to all without bias; and (iii) the law itself should be knowable by 
all individuals. Many, including Bentham,11 have viewed courts as a means 
of serving these ideals, particularly the last two, by educating the public 
and disciplining the state. 
Open courts educate the public about the court system by allowing them 
to see the functioning of the courts. Through access to the courts, the public 
gains familiarity with courts and court proceedings.12 Open courts are also 
said to facilitate public participation in the “ritual of the trial,” creating the 
sense among the public that they have an important role to play in calling 
the state to account. Indeed, courtrooms are designed as physical expres-
sions of the relationship between the public and the ideals of justice.13 Open 
10 William Blackstone, Commentaries On the Laws of England: Book The First (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1765) at 138, online: <www.gutenberg.org> [emphasis in original]. 
11 See John Bowring, ed, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence 
of John Bowring, 9th ed (Edinburgh, UK: Tait, 1843) at 493. See also Judith Resnik, “Bring 
Back Bentham: ‘Open Courts’, ‘Terror Trials’ and Public Sphere(s)” (2011) 4 L & Ethics 
Human Rights 4 at 5, online: <digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
4877&context=fss_papers>. 
12 See generally David A Harris, “The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Televi-
sion, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System” (1993) 35 Ariz L Rev 785. 
13 See Linda Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge, 2011) at 10, 84; Judith Resnik, Dennis E Curtis & Allison Anna Tait, Con-
structing Courts: Architecture, the Ideology of Judging, and the Public Sphere, ed by Richard K 
Sherwin & Anne Wagner (New York: Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg, 2013) 515 at 515.
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courts can build public investment14 in the process of justice (particularly 
in criminal cases, where crimes are characterized as an offence against the 
community as a whole).15 It has also been suggested that the open court 
principle could reduce crime by allowing the public to express disapprov-
al of the acts of criminally convicted persons, and by promoting public 
discussion of important issues.16 Canadian jurisprudence also closely con-
nects the principle with constitutional rights to free expression and free-
dom of the media, which the Supreme Court of Canada has held to include 
“freedom to express new ideas and to put forward opinions about the func-
tioning of public institutions.”17
The very legitimacy of the legal system depends on “public acceptance 
of process and outcome,”18 and the open court system promotes this ac-
ceptance by ensuring the accountability of the justice system. Canadian 
courts regularly state that the open court principle builds public confi-
dence19 in the integrity of the judicial system by allowing members of the 
public to hold judges to account.20 For example, in MacIntyre, the Supreme 
Court of Canada, relying on the words of Bentham, noted that there is a 
strong public policy in favour of “openness” with respect to judicial acts. 
The rationale of this last-mentioned consideration has been eloquently 
expressed by Bentham in these terms:
In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape have 
full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks 
applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity there is 
no justice . . . . Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to 
14 Historically, however, only those able to attend court and literate members of the public 
were able to read newspaper reports and actually follow court proceedings. See McLachlin, 
supra note 5 at 2. 
15 See Mulcahy, supra note 13 at 84.
16 Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835 at 883, 120 DLR (4th) 12 [Dagenais]; 
AB v Bragg Communications Inc, 2010 NSSC 215 at paras 30–33, 293 NSR (2d) 222 [Bragg 
NSSC].
17 Dagenais, supra note 16 at 877.
18 Mulcahy, supra note 13 at 10, 84.
19 See Elizabeth F Judge, “Canada’s Courts Online: Privacy, Public Access and Electronic Court 
Records” in Patrick A Molinari, ed, Dialogues About Justice: The Public Legislators, Courts and 
the Media (Montreal: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2002) 1 at 11.
20 See AG (Nova Scotia) v MacIntyre, [1982] 1 SCR 175 at 185–86, 132 DLR (3d) 385 [MacIntyre]; 
Adult Entertainment Assn of Canada v Ottawa (City), 10 MPLR (4th) 112 at para 17, 142 ACWS 
(3d) 338 [Nuden]; Scott v Scott, [1913] AC 417 at 463 (HL (Eng)) [Scott]; R v Mentuck, 2001 
SCC 76 at para 53, [2001] 3 SCR 442 [Mentuck]; AB v Bragg Communications Inc, 2011 NSCA 
26 at para 74, 322 NSR (2d) 1 [Bragg NSCA]. 
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exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge 
himself while trying under trial.21
It is not just judges who are presumably held to account by the open 
court principle. The principle is also said to support positive results with 
respect to other justice system players and functions outside of the court-
room, including police officers and warrants.22 The openness of trials has 
been held to be an expression of the judge’s confidence that what happens 
in the courtroom is “beyond reproach.”23 Transparency in the processes 
of justice is not only thought to act as a “powerful disinfectant” for ex-
posing and remedying abuses;24 by acting in public view, the courts can 
demonstrate that fair trials (rather than show trials where conviction is a 
foregone conclusion) are still happening.25 
The open court principle, therefore, can clearly be understood to be 
a means of assuring the public accountability of the court system and its 
key actors, particularly judges. Open courts, however, also put parties and 
witnesses on public view in ways that can compromise their privacy and 
dignity, without necessarily contributing to the underlying purposes of 
public transparency, accountability, and access to justice. Unless specif-
ically determined otherwise (see Part II for a discussion of some of the 
Canadian exceptions to the open court principle), every aspect of their 
participation in the court process is available to the public: names and 
other identifying information, details of the court action, the substance of 
testimony, and details included in documents filed with the court. 
Openness of the courts with respect to parties’ and witnesses’ personal 
information is said to increase the accountability of these participants in 
the justice process. Blackstone, for example, argues in his Commentaries 
of 1752 that one positive consequence of this visibility is that it could aid 
in the discovery of truth in the context of examining witnesses: “[t]his 
open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, 
is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private and 
secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or his clerk.”26
21 MacIntyre, supra note 20 at 183, citing Bowring, supra note 11 at 493.
22 See ibid at 183–84, 186–87; Mentuck, supra note 20 at para 51; X v Y, 2011 BCSC 943 at para 
15, 338 DLR (4th) 156 [X].
23 Loveridge v British Columbia, 2005 BCSC 1068 at para 73, 52 BCLR (4th) 178 [Loveridge].
24 See R v Shayler, [2002] UKHL 11, [2003] 1 AC 247.
25 See Mentuck, supra note 20 at para 53.
26 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1768) vol 3, ch 23 at 373, cited in Edmonton Journal v The Attorney General for Alberta and the 
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One claim is that witnesses will be more likely to be truthful if testi-
mony is public; another claim is that additional witnesses (or informa-
tion) could be prompted by public knowledge of what happens in the 
court. Others have claimed that open courts and the identification of the 
witnesses and parties therein could encourage plaintiffs to come forward 
to seek redress in the courts for similar issues. The public scrutiny sup-
ported by the open court principle has been said to produce positive re-
sults for parties and witnesses in both civil and criminal proceedings,27 for 
example, by allowing accused persons who are acquitted28 and defamed 
persons who win at trial29 to vindicate their names and reputations in the 
public eye. At the same time, the open court principle is thought to in-
crease public safety and the accountability of those involved in legal pro-
ceedings by subjecting them to public scrutiny. 
Notwithstanding national and international legal protections for the 
open court principle, like many other fundamental rights and principles, 
it is not absolute.30 Canadian courts have recognized that limiting public 
scrutiny can actually enhance justice in some cases by:
1. preventing juries from being influenced by outside sources (e.g., to facili-
tate a fair hearing for an accused person); 
2. encouraging witnesses to testify without fear of publicity consequences;
3. protecting vulnerable witnesses (e.g., children or sexual assault com-
plainants);
4. preserving the privacy of participants in the justice process;
5. reducing the stigma of conviction for young offenders, thereby increas-
ing the possibility of rehabilitation;
6. encouraging reporting of sexual offences by reducing the fear of no-
toriety associated with becoming a complainant;
7. saving financial or emotional costs to justice system participants; 
8. protecting national security;31 and
Attorney General of Canada, [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at 1338, 64 DLR (4th) 577 [Edmonton Journal 
cited to SCR].
27 See e.g. Bragg NSSC, supra note 16 at para 25; Nuden, supra note 20; B(A) v Stubbs (1999), 
44 OR (3d) 391, 175 DLR (4th) 370 [B(A) cited to OR]; Edmonton Journal, supra note 26; Da-
genais, supra note 16; Josipovicz v Whyte, 2010 ONSC 2962, 189 ACWS (3d) 44 [Josipovicz]; 
Davidge v Fairholm, 2014 BCSC 2150, 247 ACWS (3d) 101 [Davidge]; Loveridge, supra note 23.
28 See Mentuck, supra note 20 at para 54.
29 See Bragg NSSC, supra note 16 at para 102. 
30 See McLachlin, supra note 5 at 11.
31 See Dagenais, supra note 16 at 883–84.
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9. protecting ongoing police investigations.32
Thus, notwithstanding the default in favour of openness and many 
sound arguments about its underlying purposes, it has long been recog-
nized that, in some instances, justice can in fact be undermined by too 
much openness. In Canada, numerous limitations on the open court prin-
ciple in statutory provisions, as well as through case-by-case mechanisms 
through which parties can seek restrictions, reflect this fact.
B. The Principle’s Exceptions and Limitations
There are a variety of statute-based limitations on the open court princi-
ple in Canada. Some operate automatically in certain kinds of cases, while 
the applicability of others is determined on a case-by-case basis. 
Even without a legislative provision that creates an exception to the 
open court principle, courts have common law and equitable powers to 
limit the principle of openness on a case-by-case basis. These include 
requests for publication bans, in camera proceedings, confidentiality or 
sealing orders, and anonymity/pseudonymity orders. The relevant case 
law sets out much of the key jurisprudential thinking on the import-
ance, underlying purposes, and limitations of the open court principle. A 
party seeking an exception to the default of openness bears the burden 
of demonstrating that limiting openness is necessary in order to protect 
a countervailing interest of sufficient public importance. In many cases, 
the media are notified that applications for these kinds of orders will be 
made,33 so the party seeking the limitation can often expect media repre-
sentatives to attend the application hearing in order to oppose it on the 
basis of freedom of expression and freedom of the press. 
A publication ban imposes limits on the distribution of some or all in-
formation relating to a court proceeding. In cases where a publication ban 
has been imposed, even though nothing can be distributed about the pro-
ceeding outside of the courtroom, members of the public may attend the 
hearing.34 In contrast, orders that require proceedings to be held in camera 
prohibit members of the public from attending altogether. Confidentiality 
or sealing orders may be made to prevent certain kinds of material filed in 
32 See Mentuck, supra note 20 at para 46.
33 See e.g. Alberta Provincial Court, E-File Notice of Application for Publication Ban, online: 
<www.albertacourts.ca>; British Columbia Supreme Court, Publication Ban Notification 
Project, online: <www.courts.gov.bc.ca>.
34 See e.g. Canadian Broadcasting Corp v The Queen, 2011 SCC 3 at para 13, [2011] 1 SCR 65 [CBC].
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connection with court proceedings (e.g. documents produced in litigation 
that disclose trade secrets or exhibits filed in court) from becoming pub-
licly accessible.35 Anonymity/pseudonymity orders can permit a variety of 
justice system participants (e.g. parties and witnesses) to participate in a 
proceeding using a pseudonym (e.g. their initials), instead of having to use 
their real names. Unlike other kinds of exceptions to the open court princi-
ple, anonymity/pseudonymity orders preclude public access to identifying 
information about the justice system participant but do not, on their own, 
restrict public access to the hearing itself or to documents filed in connec-
tion with the proceeding (assuming identifying information is removed 
from those materials).36 
Regardless of the mechanism chosen, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
stated37 that any discretionary decisions affecting the openness of proceed-
ings are to be analyzed according to the approach outlined in Dagenais38 
and Mentuck,39 in light of the specific facts at issue in the particular case in 
which a limiting order is sought. In Bragg, where a teen girl sought a publi-
cation ban on the content of a Facebook page containing “sexualized cyber-
bullying,” as well as the right to proceed with the case using a pseudonym, 
the Court articulated the test as follows:
The inquiry is into whether . . . [the requested restriction] is necessary to 
protect an important legal interest and impairs free expression as little 
as possible. If alternative measures can just as effectively protect the in-
terests engaged, the restriction is unjustified. If no such alternatives exist, 
the inquiry turns to whether the proper balance was struck between the 
open court principle and the privacy rights of the girl.40
The Court indicated that the legal interest impaired by publicity had 
to be demonstrated to be sufficiently compelling to warrant restricting 
the open court principle, and that while specific evidence of the harm 
that would arise from publicity is relevant, there may be circumstances in 
which such harm can be inferred objectively without the need to tender 
evidence.41 In many other cases, however, Canadian courts have been very 
35 See e.g. Sierra Club of Canada v Canada, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 SCR 522.
36 See AB v Bragg Communications Inc, 2012 SCC 46 at para 28, [2012] 2 SCR 567 [Bragg SCC]; 
T(S) v Stubbs, [1998] 38 OR (3d) 788, 158 DLR (4th) 555 [T(S) cited to OR].
37 See CBC, supra note 34 at para 13.
38 Supra note 16.
39 Supra note 20.
40 Bragg SCC, supra note 36 at para 11.
41 See ibid at para 15.
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clear that mere embarrassment or humiliation arising from the publicity 
associated with the proceedings will not be enough.42
The default toward openness in court proceedings is undoubtedly 
underlain by important democratic concerns, including the role of the 
media in drawing attention to the operations of courts as public institu-
tions. It is not our intention to question the open court principle as a 
whole, but rather to focus on one aspect of the principle that raises par-
ticular concerns in an era of online publication — presumed public access 
to parties’ and witnesses’ personal information. As such, Part II focuses 
on that particular aspect of the open court principle and examines his-
torical claims about the need for public access to parties’ and witnesses’ 
personal information. In it we suggest a need for further analysis of any 
assumed connection between public access to that information and the 
stated underlying purposes of the open court principle, even before turn-
ing to the concerning privacy effects of making this kind of information 
publicly available online, in Part III. 
II. DEFAULT IN FAVOUR OF PUBLIC ACCESSIBILITY OF PARTIES’ 
AND WITNESSES’ PERSONAL INFORMATION 
A. Underlying Purposes and Connections to the Open Court 
Principle
Because the open court principle, in tandem with media rights to freedom 
of expression, has been interpreted broadly to presumptively include all 
information relating to civil and criminal legal proceedings, parties’ and 
witnesses’ personal information is by definition presumed to be accessible. 
But how does public access to personal information actually contribute to 
the underlying objectives of the open court principle? After reviewing the 
literature and the Canadian case law on this point, we have identified five 
kinds of claims about the connection, all of which merit further analysis 
for reasons described below.
First, it could be claimed that open access to parties’ and witnesses’ 
personal information directly serves the open court principle’s underlying 
objective of holding judicial and state authorities to account. If we know 
42 See e.g. B(A), supra note 27 at 399; Nuden, supra note 20 at para 16; Scott, supra note 20 at 
463; Josipovicz, supra note 27 at para 96. The courts seem particularly disposed to varying 
the “open court” rule for the protection of vulnerable parties including children. See The 
Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners, “Wealthy Beneficiaries Entitled to Anonymity”, 
STEP (27 October 2014), online: <www.step.org>.
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the party’s or witness’s identity, it may tell us something about the impar-
tiality or lack of impartiality of the judge, as well as other state actors 
involved in the case. If, for example, a judge was determining the liability 
or guilt of a relative, or a Crown Attorney was prosecuting a close friend, 
knowing those parties’ identities might indeed affect public perceptions 
of the fairness of the administration of justice. This would similarly be 
true if the party or witness were a public figure otherwise involved in the 
administration of justice. However, given that conflict of interest rules 
and regulations already govern the assignment of cases to judges and the 
decisions of lawyers (including Crown Attorneys) to take cases, it is diffi-
cult to see why the current default in favour of public access to all personal 
information of parties and witnesses is necessary in order to facilitate ac-
countability and transparency (particularly in light of the privacy implica-
tions involved).
Second, it could and has been claimed that open access to witness-
es’ personal information could enhance the truth finding function of the 
open court principle by encouraging other witnesses to come forward43 
(perhaps to counter the truth of the account given by a particular witness). 
Suppose, for example, that X testifies that they personally witnessed the 
offender driving through a red light at a specific intersection on a par-
ticular date, but one of X’s acquaintances knows that they were meeting 
with X in a different city at the very time the incident about which X is 
testifying occurred. In this situation, publicity relating to X’s name might 
encourage the person with that information to come forward, thereby en-
hancing the truth finding process. Using similar logic, the court in Carter 
rejected a witness’s request for total anonymity, finding that if “L.M. does 
not have to identify himself in court, the parties will not be able to test his 
evidence.”44 
Third, it could and has been claimed that open access to witnesses’ 
and parties’ personal information will enhance the truth finding process 
by pressuring them to speak the truth, knowing that their names and ac-
counts will be open to public scrutiny.45 Justice Wilson, in Edmonton Jour-
43 See e.g. B(A), supra note 27 at para 36; Edmonton Journal, supra note 26 at 1358; Josipovicz, 
supra note 27 at para 84; Dagenais, supra note 16 at 883; Loveridge, supra note 23 at para 41.
44 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 BCSC 1371 at para 73, 206 ACWS (3d) 303.
45 See e.g. Nuden, supra note 27 at para 8; Dagenais, supra note 16 at 883; Loveridge, supra note 
23 at para 41; B(A), supra note 27 at para 36; Edmonton Journal, supra note 26 at 1358; Josipo-
vicz, supra note 27 at para 84; Davidge, supra note 27 at para 14.
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nal, tied the second and third claims together as follows, quoting from 
Wigmore:
[The ways in which openness of judicial proceedings] improve the quality 
of testimony is two-fold. Subjectively, it produces in the witness’ mind a 
disinclination to falsify; first, by stimulating the instinctive responsibility 
to public opinion, symbolized in the audience, and ready to scorn a dem-
onstrated liar; and next, by inducing the fear of exposure of subsequent 
falsities through disclosure by informed persons who may chance to be 
present. Objectively, it secures the presence of those who by possibility 
may be able to furnish testimony in chief or to contradict falsifiers and 
yet may not have been known beforehand to the parties to possess any 
information.46
As noted above in Carter, total anonymity could indeed compromise 
the parties’ ability to test a witness’s evidence. Widespread publication 
of identifying and other personal information regarding witnesses might 
have the additional beneficial effect of eliciting relevant information from 
the broader public, thus enhancing the truth finding process. Whether 
and how frequently this outcome manifests, however, remains an empir-
ical question. It is, nonetheless, evident that this particular benefit could 
occur only under very specific circumstances wherein an individual with 
information material to the case is not involved as a party and has not at-
tended the court in person — but maintains a significant enough interest 
to learn about the case through other means, and is motivated enough to 
come forward with new information to contest existing testimony. 
Whether, as is claimed in Edmonton Journal, open access to the per-
sonal information of parties and witnesses will lead to more truthful 
reporting is also an empirical question — and a complicated one at that. 
Experimental research has repeatedly demonstrated that identified in-
formants provide more truthful reports than do anonymous informants.47 
However, the contrast we are talking about here is more complex, since 
parties and witnesses present in court for testimony are typically identi-
fied, and even if anonymous, typically give their evidence in full view of the 
46 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol 6, rev by James H Chadburn 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1976) at 435–36 [emphasis omitted], cited with approval in Edmon-
ton Journal, supra note 26 at 1358.
47 See Jacquelyn Burkell, “Anonymity in Behavioural Research; Not Being Unnamed, But Be-
ing Unknown” (2006) 3:1 U Ottawa L & Technology J at 189–203.
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court, a condition which in and of itself tends to decrease false reports.48 
It remains an open question whether future identification or anonymity 
(i.e., in media coverage and records open to the general public) has an 
influence on truthfulness — on this point there is no existing empirical 
evidence. We would suggest that to justify the intrusion on the privacy of 
witnesses and parties, there should at least be empirical studies carried 
out in order to determine whether the assumptions underlying this claim 
are actually borne out.
A fourth claim about the connection between open courts and disclo-
sure of parties’ personal information relates more to a kind of quid pro quo, 
almost punitive logic, that availing oneself of the court system imposes a 
certain burden of responsibility on a party. For example, in Loveridge the 
Court denied a plaintiff’s request for a publication ban, noting:
It is not apparent to me why a plaintiff commencing action in this Court 
should be seen as having a smaller obligation to the integrity of the process 
than does the Judge, the jury, the sheriff, the court clerk, counsel and other 
witnesses. By commencing action, a plaintiff commits himself or herself to 
various kinds of proper conduct, including the obligation to disclose infor-
mation and the obligation to speak the truth. I can see no rationale for pro-
tecting a plaintiff by a publication ban from the risk of public opprobrium 
for breach of these obligations. Everyone else in the process is at that risk.49 
We would suggest that it is at least worth questioning whether this puni-
tive approach to presumptive public access to a plaintiff’s information has 
a place in a justice system oriented toward facilitating access for resolution 
of disputes. Moreover, the underlying logic does not apply to those who 
are drawn into legal disputes against their will and/or who have no choice 
but to participate in court proceedings to access their fundamental rights.
The fifth claim appears to have, at best, a tangential connection to the 
underlying purposes of the open court principle. In Bragg, the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal suggested that a teen suing for sexualized cyberbullying 
might in fact benefit from publication of her name, as would the public at 
large:
Should she be successful, one might expect that she will be lauded for her 
courage in defending her good name and rooting out on-line bullies who 
48 Ibid.
49 Loveridge, supra note 23 at para 76. See also Bragg NSSC, supra note 16 at paras 22, 32; Scott, 
supra note 20 at 463.
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lurk in the bushes, behind a nameless IP address. The public will be much 
better informed as to what words constitute defamation, and alerted to the 
consequences of sharing information through social networking among 
“friends” on a 21st century bulletin board with a proven global reach.50
Notably, this extends the putative benefits of the open court and nam-
ing names beyond learning about law and legal processes, to using law to 
educate the public about other kinds of social problems. At the end of the 
day, however, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the teen to proceed 
pseudonymously, emphasizing that the open court principle must some-
times give way to other pressing social values, including privacy.51 As such, 
it seems clear that the idea that public education should be conducted on 
the backs of litigants who are only seeking to vindicate their rights should 
and has given way, in some cases, to the pressing social value of privacy.
Canadian courts are often quite strict in their protection of the open 
court principle, especially where the media is contesting an application 
for a publication ban or other form of confidentiality order. However, it is 
clear that public disclosure of parties’ and witnesses’ personal information 
remains a presumption, rather than an absolute rule. That presumption 
can be displaced by proof of serious competing values of public import-
ance, and of the particular vulnerability of the party seeking the order. 
The balance between the competing values is resolved on a case-by-case 
basis, leading to somewhat unpredictable results. For example, Canadian 
courts have denied pseudonymity orders to adult entertainment perform-
ers;52 plaintiffs alleging sexual assault in civil actions;53 a plaintiff seeking 
damages for failed penile enlargement surgery in the absence of specific 
evidence of psychiatric harm flowing from disclosure of his identity;54 and 
a plaintiff who feared reprisal if their sexual orientation was disclosed.55 
In contrast, courts have permitted parties to proceed pseudonymously 
where name disclosure posed a real threat of physical harm from organ-
ized crime;56 where a teen plaintiff subjected to sexualized cyberbullying 
50 Bragg NCSA, supra note 20 at para 102. 
51 See Bragg SCC, supra note 36 at paras 11, 13.
52 See Nuden, supra note 20. 
53 See Jane Doe, “What’s In a Name? Who Benefits from the Publication Ban in Sexual As-
sault Trials” in Ian Kerr, Valerie Steeves & Carole Lucock, eds, Lessons from the Identity 
Trial: Anonymity, Privacy and Identity In a Networked Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 265.
54 See B(A), supra note 27.
55 See Josipovicz, supra note 27. 
56 See X, supra note 22.
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faced a risk of emotional harm;57 where name disclosure posed a real threat 
to the security of a witness and their family;58 where there was specific evi-
dence of a serious risk of psychological harm to the recipient of a failed 
penile enlargement surgery;59 where non-disclosure could protect the iden-
tity of a police informant;60 where non-disclosure would minimize the long 
term stigma attaching to a young offender;61 and where non-disclosure was 
deemed necessary to protect the professional reputation of a physician in a 
judicial review proceeding that involved highly personal information about 
the doctor and patient and disclosure of names would undermine the very 
purpose of the proceeding.62
In some cases where pseudonymity orders are permitted (without 
any other form of restriction in terms of public access to the proceedings 
themselves), Canadian courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, 
have referred to the names of the parties as only a “sliver of [the] infor-
mation” available to the public about the case, suggesting that removing 
this information from the court record therefore impairs the open court 
principle very minimally.63 This highlights the fact that names constitute 
only part, and not necessarily a critically important part, of the informa-
tion about litigants and witnesses that is revealed in the course of a court 
proceeding.
It is possible to see from this overview that the reasons offered in fa-
vour of presumptive public access to parties’ and witnesses’ personal in-
formation merit closer inspection and analysis, even before getting to the 
question of whether that information should be made publicly available 
online, especially in view of the competing privacy interests at stake. Some 
of the reasons offered are based on assumptions about human behaviour 
that may or may not be borne out by empirical analysis, and most do not 
directly relate to the open court principle’s original and fundamental ob-
jective of transparency and accountability of public authorities.
Perhaps this at least partially explains why, despite the presumption 
and its claimed benefits, Canadian public policy has consistently resisted 
moving toward what would perhaps be the ultimate forms of accountabil-
57 See Bragg SCC, supra note 36.
58 See R v Pickton, 2010 BCSC 1198, 89 WCB (2d) 582 [Pickton].
59 See T(S), supra note 36. 
60 See MacIntyre, supra note 20, Martland J, dissenting.
61 See Re FN, 2000 SCC 35, [2000] 1 SCR 880 [FN].
62 VF v ST, 2010 BCSC 1874, 196 ACWS (3d) 379.
63 Bragg SCC, supra note 36 at para 28, citing FN, supra note 61 at para 12; BG et al v HMTQ in 
Right of BC, 2004 BCCA 345, 242 DLR (4th) 665.
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ity for witnesses and parties: televised trials and cameras in trial courts.64 
It may also help to account for the fact that the presumption has been 
reversed in several contexts where competing values of public importance 
were at stake. 
B. Exceptions to Public Accessibility of Names
In addition to ad hoc situations in which courts are asked to exercise their 
discretion to prevent disclosure of a party’s or witness’s name, there are 
also various statutory regimes in Canada that specifically prohibit disclo-
sure of personal information about certain vulnerable parties and witness-
es. Here we highlight two prominent examples: Criminal Code restrictions 
with respect to the identities of sexual assault complainants,65 and Youth 
Criminal Justice Act restrictions with respect to the identities of young 
offenders.66 Our purposes in so doing are threefold: (i) to better under-
stand the presumed relationship between disclosure of personal informa-
tion and the open court principle more generally; (ii) to identify what it 
is about these two situations that has led legislatures to reverse the pre-
sumption of disclosure of parties’ and/or witnesses’ personal information; 
and (iii) to examine how courts asked to interpret and apply these pro-
visions have resolved the dilemma between the powerful rhetoric of the 
open court principle and the presumption of non-disclosure of personal 
information in these cases.
1. Publication Bans Re: Sexual Assault Complainants in Criminal 
Proceedings
While the Criminal Code permits a judge to order exclusion of the pub-
lic and (in respect of certain offences) a ban on publication of personal 
information about a victim or witness in any criminal case,67 in the case 
of certain sexual offences, a judge must order non-disclosure of personal 
information about a complainant or witness who is under eighteen upon 
64 See e.g. Edward Carter, “Supreme Court Oral Argument Video: A Review of Media Effects 
Research and Suggestions for Study” (2012) BYUL Rev 1719; James Linton, “Camera Ac-
cess to Courtrooms: Canadian, US and Australian Experiences” (1993) 18:1 Can J Commu-
nication 15.
65 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 486.
66 Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1, s 101. 
67 Criminal Code, supra note 65 at ss 486(1), 486.4. See e.g. Pickton, supra note 58.
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request by that person or by the prosecutor.68 In cases where a ban is op-
tional, the Criminal Code requires judges to consider whether the order is 
necessary for the “proper administration of justice,” having regard for a 
series of factors, including: the right to a fair and public hearing, whether 
the applicant faces “a real and substantial risk” of significant harm if their 
identity is disclosed, whether the order is necessary for the security of the 
applicant, societal interests in encouraging the reporting of offences, and 
whether effective alternatives are available.69
The Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Newspapers found that the 
Criminal Code provisions relating to witnesses and complainants in sexual 
offence cases constituted a justifiable limit on freedom of expression (and 
the open court principle) in part because the provisions encouraged the 
reporting of sexual offences and furthered the goal of suppressing crim-
inal activity:
Encouraging victims to come forward and complain facilitates the pros-
ecution and conviction of those guilty of sexual offences. Ultimately, the 
overall objective of the publication ban . . . is to favour the suppression of 
crime and to improve the administration of justice.70
In addition, the Court noted that if the goal of suppressing crimin-
al activity was to be achieved, particularly with respect to sexual assault 
(one of the most under-reported crimes), complainants had to be certain 
before coming forward with a complaint that their identities would be 
protected if requested.71 Otherwise, the fear of humiliation and embar-
rassment that might arise from publication of their identities would deter 
victims of sexual assault from coming forward.72 Further, the Court found 
that the provision struck an appropriate balance between open courts, 
free expression of the media, and privacy because: 
[It] applies only to sexual offence cases, it restricts publication of facts 
disclosing the complainant’s identity and it does not provide for a gen-
68 Criminal Code, supra note 65, s 486.4(2). Where child pornography offences are concerned, 
a judge is required to order non-disclosure of identifying information relating to anyone 
who is the subject of the content and to any witness who is under 18 (ibid, s 486.4(3)).
69 Ibid, s 486.5(7).
70 Canadian Newspapers Co v Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 122 at 30, 52 DLR (4th) 
690 [Canadian Newspapers].
71 See ibid at 131–32. See also R v Adams, [1995] 4 SCR 707, 131 DLR (4th) 1.
72 See Canadian Newspapers, supra note 70 at 131–32. See also Doe, supra note 53 (for a dif-
ferent analysis of who benefits from publication bans with respect to sexual assault com-
plainants’ identities).
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eral ban but is limited to instances where the complainant or prosecutor 
requests the order or the court considers it necessary. Nothing prevents 
the media from being present at the hearing and reporting the facts of the 
case and the conduct of the trial.  Only information likely to reveal the 
complainant’s identity is concealed from the public.73 
In this case then, the statutory derogation from the presumption of 
openness depends upon the protection of a vulnerable group where af-
fording that protection was found to further the justice system’s goal of 
suppressing criminal activity by encouraging reporting of a highly un-
reported crime. As the Supreme Court of Canada put it more recently in 
Bragg, “[i]n the context of sexual assault, this Court has already recog-
nized that protecting a victim’s privacy encourages reporting.”74
2. Publication Bans Re: Young Offenders
In Canada, the presumption of openness with respect to publishing per-
sonal information is also reversed in the context of youth who are crimin-
ally prosecuted, youth who are the victims of crimes committed by other 
youth, or youth who are witnesses in criminal proceedings against another 
youth, subject to limited exceptions.75 The Supreme Court of Canada in Re 
FN concluded that this ban applied not just to media, but also prohibited 
courts from engaging in certain administrative practices, such as circu-
lating to schools court dockets containing the names of youths charged.76 
The reasons for reversing the presumption of openness in relation 
to minors appears to originate from the perspective that confidentiality 
is crucial to effective rehabilitation and treatment.77 In Re FN the Court 
found that a ban on publishing identifying information about youth in-
volved in criminal proceedings did not significantly compromise the open 
court principle:
The youth courts are open to the public, and their proceedings are proper-
ly subject to public scrutiny. The confidentiality relates only to the “sliver 
73 Canadian Newspapers, supra note 70 at 133.
74 Bragg SCC, supra note 36 at para 25.
75 For example, the names of convicted youth given adult sentences may be published, and 
there are a limited number of cases in which an application can be made to lift a publication 
ban with respect to criminally convicted youths in certain situations (e.g., where the youth 
is thought to be a danger to society). See Youth Criminal Justice Act, supra note 66, s 110.
76 See FN, supra note 61.
77 See Emily Bazelon, “Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom 
Doors Be Open or Closed?” (1999) 18:1 Yale L & Pol’y Rev 155.
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of information” that identifies the alleged or convicted young offender as 
a person in trouble with the law.78
Moreover, the Court emphasized that confidentiality in these circum-
stances protected both the interests of the youth involved and broader 
societal interests in rehabilitation:
Stigmatization or premature “labelling” of a young offender still in his or 
her formative years is well understood as a problem in the juvenile justice 
system. A young person once stigmatized as a lawbreaker may, unless given 
help and redirection, render the stigma a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the 
long run, society is best protected by preventing recurrence. Lamer C.J., 
in Dagenais . . . pointed out in another context that non-publication is de-
signed to “maximize the chances of rehabilitation for ‘young offenders.’”79
Nonetheless, the ideal that society is better served by ensuring a meas-
ure of confidentiality for young offenders can be challenged when public 
safety considerations are brought to the fore.80 That protection of young 
people’s privacy is subject to countervailing public safety considerations 
is evident in Canada’s Youth Criminal Justice Act, which provides that, on 
application, a court may lift the ban on publication if there is reason to 
believe the youth may be a danger to others or where publication of the 
information is necessary to apprehend the youth.81
In the case of young offenders then, the statutory reversal of the pre-
sumption of openness combines concerns for protecting the ability of 
members of a vulnerable group to rehabilitate, with the broader aim of so-
cietal protection. As with provisions relating to publication bans in cases of 
sexual assault, publication bans with respect to the personal information 
of young offenders are understood to acceptably compromise the open 
court principle in service of privacy and broader community objectives.
There are many good reasons for maintaining an open court princi-
ple in a democratic society, particularly in terms of improving transpar-
ency and accountability of public officials and the public justice system. 
Similarly, reasons can and have been offered for presumptive access to 
parties’ and witnesses’ personal information as a necessary component 
of maintaining an open court system. We have suggested above that there 
78 FN, supra note 61 at para 12.
79 Ibid at para 14.
80 See Kristin Henning, “Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should 
Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?” (2004) 79:2 NYUL Rev 520.
81 Youth Criminal Justice Act, supra note 66, s 110(4).
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may be reasons to question the assumptions underlying this presumptive 
access, and have noted numerous examples of both exceptions to that pre-
sumption and statutory reversals of it in cases involving competing pub-
lic rights and interests, including privacy. The movement toward online 
accessibility of court records brings these competing rights and interests, 
especially privacy interests, into ever-greater relief and strengthens the 
case for revisiting and limiting the presumption in favour of accessibility 
of parties’ and witnesses’ personal information. In so doing, one need not 
abandon public access to this kind of information or the possibility of any 
of the positive effects that may attach to such access. Instead, we suggest 
the possibility of reversing the presumption in the context of online rec-
ords in an effort to maintain the same degree of friction in accessing this 
personal information as experienced by accessing paper records.
III. ONLINE PUBLICATION AND THE EROSION OF PRACTICAL 
OBSCURITY
A.  Open Access in the Online Context
The history of “open access” is one of increasing and wider visibility. Ori-
ginally, an “open court” was, quite literally, a court whose doors were 
open — both in the sense that any and all could seek redress within the 
court, and in the sense that all were free to attend the proceedings and wit-
ness the actions of the court and all parties. Nothing was “private” — even 
executions were carried out in full public view. At the same time, public 
witnesses to proceedings were limited to those who, for whatever reasons, 
were present at those proceedings and thus able to see and hear the pro-
ceedings as they commenced. 
Over time, the open access principle has been extended to support 
public “view” of court proceedings without actual attendance. Media 
coverage provides details of (some) court proceedings to the general 
public, with a reach far beyond those who actually attend the courtroom, 
and unless expressly disallowed, media are allowed to attend and report 
on court proceedings. As noted above, in Canada, as in many other juris-
dictions, the open court principle extends the right of public access or 
media coverage not only to court proceedings, but also to records and 
documents filed in connection with those proceedings.82 The public can 
come to know about proceedings in court, therefore, by reviewing court 
82 See Edmonton Journal, supra note 26 at 1338. 
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documents (transcripts, pleadings, submissions, judgments, etc.). Histor-
ically, these documents have been held in paper form at the courthouse, 
accessible to the public upon attendance at that location. Recently, and to 
an ever-increasing degree, paper court documents are giving way to elec-
tronic submissions and records. Electronic documents support alternative 
and broader forms of dissemination: Ontario Court of Justice daily court 
dockets, for example, are available online (www.ontariocourtdates.ca), 
providing a publicly accessible and searchable record of current court pro-
ceedings; the Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII) hosts court 
judgments, tribunal decisions, statutes, and regulations from all Canadian 
jurisdictions in a publicly accessible, searchable online database; and Brit-
ish Columbia’s Court Services Online makes certain court files searchable 
electronically from the comfort of one’s own home.83 These developments 
can be viewed as a natural extension of open access principles, in that they 
enhance existing public access to court documents. 
Although court documents contain information that is clearly private 
in nature, in the vast majority of cases these documents are deemed ac-
cessible to the public under the open court principle. As discussed above, 
there are very few statutory regimes that protect the personal information 
of parties and witnesses, and ad hoc requests for protection can impose 
significant financial burdens on the individuals seeking protection and 
are regularly refused by the courts unless significant competing public in-
terests can be demonstrated. As is evident from Part II above, the open 
court principle, and specifically access to personal information included 
in court files, is routinely and vigorously defended as being “in the public 
interest.” In particular, access to names and personal information regard-
ing witnesses and litigants is defended as part of a general “right of access” 
and presumed to effect various positive outcomes (see above) vis-à-vis 
public engagement with the court system. 
Online availability enhances public access to court documents, and in 
particular increases the visibility and availability of any personal informa-
tion included in those documents. Examined through the lens of open ac-
cess, online accessibility is a straightforward extension of an existing right. 
In the next section, we consider this change from a different perspective, 
examining the consequences of online availability for witness and party 
privacy. In particular, we examine two issues: (i) how does online avail-
ability change the accessibility of court information; and (ii) how is the 
83 See “Welcome to Court Services Online”, British Columbia, online: <gov.bc.ca/justice>. 
Revisiting the Open Court Principle in an Era of Online Publication 169
personal information contained in court files used by the public, or how 
is it likely to be used? 
B.  Information Access in the Online Context 
In 2004, Chris Anderson reflected on the fact that online access to enter-
tainment allows for a virtually unlimited catalogue, raising new possibil-
ities in retail by supporting sales of the “long tail”:84 books, music, movies, 
etc., that are not “hits” — but nonetheless have a small audience. Inherent 
in his discussion, and relevant for our purposes, is the reality that online 
distribution frees information and its accessibility from the tyrannies of 
the physical world: storage is inexpensive and virtually unlimited, and 
access is similarly unfettered by geographic and temporal constraints. 
When information is online, people with Internet access can view the in-
formation they want, where and when they want it, and they can access 
the obscure almost as easily as the popular. These realities change the 
accessibility of court information when that information is placed online. 
In the past, access to court documents required a visit to the specific court 
where the documents were held. Documents could only be viewed during 
the court office’s opening hours, and those wishing to access the docu-
ments had to make those requests in person — thus accessing those docu-
ments fully anonymously was not possible. All this changes with online 
documents, since they can be viewed at any time, using any computer with 
an Internet connection, and typically anonymously and even invisibly. In 
other words, barriers or “friction” in online court document access are 
greatly reduced, if not eliminated, and as a result the personal informa-
tion included in these documents is no longer protected by the “practical 
obscurity” inherent in access to paper documents.
Online documents are not only easier to view — they are easier to find. 
Access to paper records typically requires that one first identify the case 
number (or name) and the courthouse. Paper records can be cross-indexed 
according to a (small) number of identifiers (e.g., case number and case 
name), thus providing alternate means of access. It is not possible, how-
ever, to index paper documents “on the fly” according to different criteria, 
nor is it possible to index paper documents according to specific aspects 
of content. Electronic documents, however, can be identified virtually in-
84 Chris Anderson, “The Long Tail”, Wired Magazine (1 October 2004), online: <www.wired.
com>.
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stantaneously according to any number of criteria, and documents can be 
selected on the basis of content, as well as “header” or traditional iden-
tifying information. Thus, using full-text search, relevant documents can 
be identified that would not have been returned by searches using stan-
dard keyword or metadata based searching.85 In addition, specific case files 
can be identified on the basis of partial information that does not include 
the traditional identifiers of case name and/or case number. These search 
techniques can be carried out by a search engine that is restricted to the 
specific database (e.g., a search within the CanLII database). The power 
and reach of these techniques are even greater if court records are in-
dexed by Internet search engines (e.g., Google) on the basis of automated 
web mining.86 If court document repositories are open to search engine 
web crawlers, the documents within those repositories will be returned in 
regular Internet searches and on the basis of document contents, and not 
simply title and case number. 
People behave differently in the online environment, and these differ-
ences have implications for information access. When we interact face 
to face, we are necessarily identifiable. By contrast, online participants 
can be both anonymous and invisible. In 1983, Peter Steiner captured this 
environment in the famous New Yorker cartoon, with the caption: “[o]n 
the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog,” highlighting the fact that on-
line interaction occurs independent of physical presence. Disembodiment 
changes the nature of social interaction online.87 Many have argued that 
the anonymity and invisibility of online interaction results in an “online 
disinhibition effect,”88 which leads to increased interpersonal aggression. 
Offline social norms do not necessarily translate into the online environ-
ment, perhaps as a consequence of a sense of un-identifiability.89 The im-
pact on information-seeking can be positive: the Internet can, for example, 
be a valuable health information resource for those seeking information 
85 See Ronald N Kostoff, “Expanded Information Retrieval Using Full-Text Searching” (2010) 
36:1 J Information Science 104.
86 See Filippo Menczer, “Complementing Search Engines with Online Web Mining Agents” 
(2003) 35:2 Decision Support Systems 195.
87 See Seok Kang, “Disembodiment in Online Social Interaction: Impact of Online Chat on 
Social Support and Psychosocial Well-being” (2007) 10:3 Cyberpsychology & Behavior 475.
88 John Suler, “The Online Disinhibition Effect” (2004) 7:3 Cyberpsychology & Behavior 321.
89 See Noam Lapidot-Lefler & Azy Barak, “Effects of Anonymity, Invisibility, and Lack of 
Eye-contact on Toxic Online Disinhibition” 28:2 Computers in Human Behavior 434.
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about stigmatized topics or conditions.90 At the same time, online infor-
mation seeking may be viewed as a “safe haven” for behaviours such as 
pornography use, which can be viewed as falling outside of social norms.91 
Hubert Dreyfus raises concerns that the “disembodied presence” sup-
ported by online interaction will limit our sense of the reality of the objects 
and people with which we interact, thereby reducing our understanding of 
the consequences of our own actions.92 To extend Steiner’s 1983 observa-
tion, a great deal of knowledge about us is missing online: when online, we 
have the feeling that no one can see us, no one knows what we are doing, 
and there are few consequences to our actions.
The unprecedented availability, searchability, and indexability of in-
formation, together with the psychological and social consequences of 
disembodiment, ensure that placing court information online is not a sim-
ple extension of existing public access to court proceedings. Instead, we 
argue, the move to online access represents a qualitative shift in openness, 
and one that raises new considerations with respect to the balancing of 
the open courts and privacy principles. While this qualitative shift does 
not mean that the personal information of parties and witnesses will sole-
ly be accessed for purposes inconsistent with the objectives of the open 
court principle, it does present additional reasons to seriously doubt any 
necessary connection between presumed access to that information and 
the goal of a transparent and accountable justice system that is respectful 
of legitimate privacy interests.
C.  Value and Use of Personal Information in Court Documents
Online access to court records places parties’ and witnesses’ personal in-
formation that is contained in those records within relatively easy reach of 
those who, legally or illegally, seek to realize financial gain from that infor-
mation. Although the privacy risks borne by the parties and witnesses whose 
personal information appears in the documents are not unique to the online 
context, the searchable and indexable nature of online information exacer-
bates these risks, by making the information easily accessible to those who 
90 See RJW Cline & KM Haynes, “Consumer Health Information Seeking on the Internet: 
The State of the Art” (2001) 16:6 Health Education Research 671.
91 See Neil Selwyn, “A Safe Haven for Misbehaving? An Investigation of Online Misbehavior 
Among University Students” (2008) 26:4 Social Science Computer Rev 446 at 446.
92 See Hubert L Dreyfus, On the Internet (New York: Routledge, 2009) at 49–71.
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would use it for reasons that are not only inconsistent with, but that actually 
undermine, the underlying purposes of the open court principle.
There is obvious potential commercial value in the personal infor-
mation in court documents for marketing purposes: mining of identity 
and contact information from divorce proceedings, for example, could be 
valuable to a real estate agent who wants to identify potential clients. The 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) has, however, ruled that this type 
of use is a contravention of PIPEDA,93 in that the commercial use of per-
sonal information in the court record is unrelated to the original purposes 
of personal information collection and disclosure. According to the rul-
ing, secondary commercial use of personal information included in court 
documents requires explicit and independent consent, and without such 
consent is precluded under PIPEDA. 
The OPC ruling clearly precludes law-abiding commercial organiz-
ations within the OPC’s jurisdiction from collecting and using, for their 
own purposes, the personal information included in court files. Regulatory 
frameworks may be insufficient, however, to stop all unanticipated and in-
appropriate uses of information contained in court files. A recent situation 
in Canada provides a telling example. CanLII “make[s] Canadian law ac-
cessible for free on the Internet.”94 Their website “provides access to court 
judgments, tribunal decisions, statutes and regulations from all Canadian 
jurisdictions.”95 This information is hosted online in a publicly accessible 
database, but by stipulation the contents of the database are not indexed 
on Google or any other search engine. Thus, individual judgments along 
with any personal information they contain are accessible to the general 
public through a search on CanLII, but these judgments are not returned 
as results from a search engine such as Google. 
In 2005, the Judge’s Technology Advisory Committee (JTAC) to the Can-
adian Judicial Council recognized the privacy dangers associated with online 
publication of judgments in its Model Policy for Court Records in Canada.96 
93 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “PIPEDA Report of Findings #2015–002”, 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, online: <www.priv.gc.ca> [OPC, Findings]. See 
also Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Interpretation Bulletin: Publicly Avail-
able Information”, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, online: <www.priv.gc.ca>. As 
discussed below, this analysis was also supported in a recent Federal Court of Canada deci-
sion. See AT v Globe24h.com, 2017 FC 114, 275 ACWS (3d) 155 [AT]
94 Canadian Legal Information Institute, “About CanLII”, CanLII, online: <www.canlii.org>.
95 Ibid. 
96 See Canadian Judicial Council, “Model Policy for Access to Court Records in Canada”, 
Canadian Judicial Council (2005), online: <www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_ 
techissues_AccessPolicy_2005_en.pdf>.
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The Model Policy states that it is “a good practice to prevent indexing and 
cache storage” when posting judgments on the Internet because indexa-
tion and cache storage “makes this information available even when the 
purpose of the search is not to find court records, as any judgment could 
be found unintentionally using popular search engines like Google or Ya-
hoo.”97 The OPC has noted that Canadian courts, as well as CanLII and 
Société québecoise d’information juridique (SOQUIJ), broadly respect the 
Model Policy’s restrictions on web indexing. As such, it is the OPC’s pos-
ition that Canadians can reasonably expect that while court decisions may 
be published online, personal information contained in those decisions 
will not be searchable on popular search engines, such as Google.98 Not-
withstanding these pronouncements, however, such indexing has occurred.
In 2014, a Romanian company called Globe24h99 began using an auto-
mated text mining procedure to download judgments from CanLII into 
their own databases that are indexed by search engines, including Goo-
gle. Although the company states that its “main goal is to make law ac-
cessible for free on the Internet,”100 its business model suggests otherwise. 
Canadians who complained to Globe24h, after finding court judgments 
including their personal information indexed on the open web, were in-
formed that timely and complete removal of their personal information 
from the Globe24h database and from search indexes was available for a 
fee.101 Globe24h also offered to redact information free of charge, but re-
quired individuals requesting redaction to fill out a form containing very 
sensitive information. Although it had a removal process in line with Ro-
manian data protection law, it complied with only 30 percent of removal 
requests received, claiming that insufficient information had been provid-
ed by the other 70 percent of people requesting removal.102 Subsequently, 
a Canadian company103 developed a “solution” to the problem. For a fee 
of $1,499, this company works with a “Romanian legal clerk” following 
the “appropriate legal route” to remove the information from the open 
 97 Ibid, s 4.6.1.
 98 See OPC, Findings, supra note 93 at para 86.
 99 See generally, Globe24h, “Search the Global Database of Public Records: Case Law, Notic-
es and Clinical Trials”, Globe24h, online: <www.globe24h.com>. Some time after the deci-
sion in AT, Globe24h.com and www.caselaw.ca ceased to be available online.
100 Ibid. 
101 See Christine Dobby, “How Cyber Shame Scams are Playing on our Privacy Fears and Scal-
ing Up”, Financial Post (29 March 2014), online: <www.financialpost.com>.
102 See OPC, Findings, supra note 93, at paras 13–19.
103 See generally Reputation.ca, “Caselaw.Globe24h.com Removal”, Reputation.ca, online: 
<www.reputation.ca>.
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web.104 Not surprisingly, consumers experience these responses as “extor-
tion attempts.”105 
In a 2015 decision, the OPC determined that complaints against Globe24h 
were “well founded,” but the company refused to implement the recom-
mendation that “Globe24h delete from its servers the Canadian court and 
tribunal decisions that contain personal information and that it take the ne-
cessary steps to remove these decisions from search engine caches.”106 The 
situation is complicated by the fact that the judgments are posted to Can-
LII precisely to support open access to court information — and Globe24h 
argues that their use of the same information is consistent with this goal. 
CanLII has responded by requiring “Captcha” verification, which ensures 
files are being downloaded by a human being and not a software program. 
Further, in 2017, the Federal Court of Canada declared that the operator of 
Globe24h had violated PIPEDA and ordered him to, among other things, 
“remove all Canadian court and tribunal decisions containing personal in-
formation from Globe24h.com,”107 take steps to remove those decisions 
from search engine caches, and to refrain from further copying and repub-
lishing of such information. Although it is not clear that the Court’s order 
would have been enforceable in Romania, and we are not aware of any en-
forcement proceedings having taken place, as of the time of publication of 
this article, we were no longer able to access Globe24h.com online.
In 2015, a plaintiff sought to hold SOQUIJ (an online publisher of de-
cisions from judicial and administrative courts in Québec) responsible 
in Québec Small Claims Court after Globe24h published a legal decision 
online that included his personal address.108 Although SOQUIJ had estab-
lished a policy to redact identifying information that is unnecessary to the 
case before publishing it online, this policy only applies to decisions pub-
lished after 2010.109 Those whose personal information is incorporated in 
a decision prior to 2010 must request redaction. Unfortunately, by the 
time the plaintiff requested redaction of his personal information and SO-
QUIJ sent the modified version to CanLII, Globe24h had already copied 
the case from CanLII’s database and republished it. While this case was 
summarily dismissed, and the Federal Court’s decision in AT may have 
104 Ibid. 
105 Dobby, supra note 101.
106 OPC, Findings, supra note 93.
107 AT, supra note 93 at para 104.
108 See Thériault-Thibault c SOQUIJ, 2016 QCCQ 3210 (CanLII).
109 See SOQUIJ, “Politique Sur le Caviardage” (17 April 2014), SOQUIJ, online: <www.soquij.
qc.ca/documents/file/corpo_politiques/politique-sur-le-caviardage.pdf>.
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been influential in ultimately rendering Globe24h.com inaccessible in 
Canada, the Globe24h situation highlights the downsides to presumptive 
access to witnesses’ and parties’ personal information, which are wholly 
inconsistent with the open court principle’s objectives.
Identity theft presents an even more significant concern for those 
whose detailed personal information appears in online court documents. 
Many have raised the concern that the personal information included in 
court documents (e.g., filings in divorce proceedings in family court) raises 
the risk of identity theft.110 In one United States case, online court records 
were accessed by thieves who searched using randomly generated social 
insurance numbers. A “hit” allowed them access to the full online records, 
which included names, addresses, and birth dates: sufficient information 
to obtain credit cards in the names of those individuals.111 
Each of these privacy risks exist because personal information is in-
cluded in publicly accessible court documents, independent of the form 
of access provided to those documents. Thus, commercial organizations 
could potentially mine personal information from paper records, and 
Globe24h could potentially scan and upload judgments accessed in paper 
form. Online access to the records, however, exacerbates the risks and as-
sociated privacy concerns, by removing or greatly reducing practical bar-
riers to information access and the costs associated with that access. Thus, 
online access to court documents that include witnesses’ and litigants’ 
personal information increases vulnerability to both legal and illegal min-
ing and the re-use of this personal information. What about the use, how-
ever, by the general public? Does their use of online court documents and 
the personal information included in those documents produce benefits 
that offset the privacy costs of inappropriate use?
In the online environment, we have become a society of “searchers,” 
regularly seeking information online for a wide variety of purposes, includ-
ing (though of course not limited to) prurient interest, and a new form of 
“acceptable” voyeurism.112 People commonly search for information online 
110 See generally DR Jones, “Protecting the Treasure: An Assessment of State Court Rules and 
Policies for Access to Online Civil Court Records” (2013) 61:2 Drake L Rev 375.
111 See e.g. Bruce Cadwallader, “6 Suspected in ID Theft Via Court Web Site”, The Columbus 
Dispatch (21 December 2007), online: <www.dispatch.com>; “Police: ID Thieves Lifted 
Personal Info from Court Web Site”, Ohio.com Akron Beacon Journal (21 December 2007), 
online: <www.ohio.com>.
112 See generally Clay Calvert, Voyeur Nation: Media, Privacy, and Peering in Modern Culture 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000) [Calvert, Voyeur Nation]; Mark Andrejevic, Reality 
TV: The Work of Being Watched (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
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as a form of entertainment and a way to satisfy idle curiosity.113 “Googling” 
people (oneself or others) has become standard practice:114 a logical way, 
for example, to learn about a prospective date, or to know what they 
might learn about you through the same practice. “Lurking” in online so-
cial media profiles is equally widespread and culturally acceptable, and 
social network users regularly report accessing the profiles of others they 
know, and even those they do not know personally, simply to “see” likes, 
friends, pictures, or activities.115 As early as 1996, the (in)famous “Jenni-
Cam,” which represented the “telematic theatre of a real life,”116 garnered 
as many as one million visitors per week.117 The Internet is evidently a 
place where watching — even spying on — others is acceptable and a com-
monplace practice.118 
In the larger social context, voyeurism is no longer viewed solely as 
a pathology — what might be termed “mediated voyeurism” is a pastime 
open to anyone with a computer or television and time to spare.119 In Voy-
eur Nation, Clay Calvert defines this new form of voyeurism as “the con-
sumption of revealing images and of information about others’ apparently 
real and unguarded lives, often yet not always for the purposes of enter-
tainment but frequently at the expense of privacy and discourse, through 
the means of the mass media and Internet.”120
He posits a new cultural and potentially legal value — the voyeurism 
value — that celebrates and protects our right to watch others. This value, 
113 See generally Soo Young Rieh, “On the Web at Home: Information Seeking and Web Search-
ing in the Home Environment” (2004) 55:8 J American Society for Information Science & 
Technology 743.
114 See Thomas Nicolai et al, “The Self-Googling Phenomenon: Investigating the Performance of 
Personalized Information Resources”, online: (2009) 14:12 First Monday <www.firstmonday.
org>.
115 See e.g. Ira Wagman, “Log On, Goof Off, and Look Up: Facebook and the Rhythms of Ca-
nadian Internet Use” in Bart Beaty et al, eds, How Canadians Communicate III: Contexts of 
Popular Culture (Edmonton: Athabasca University Press, 2010) 55; Jacquelyn Burkell et al, 
“Facebook: Public Space, or Private Space?” (2014) 17:8 Information, Communication & So-
ciety 974.
116 See Barry Smith, “Jennicam, or the Telematic Theatre of a Real Life” (2005) 1:2 Intl J Per-
formance Arts & Digital Media 91.
117 See “Jennifer Ringley”, online: Wikipedia <www.wikipedia.org>; Jane Bailey, “Life in the 
Fishbowl: Feminist Interrogations of Webcamming” in Ian Kerr, Carole Lucock & Valerie 
Steeves, eds, Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy and Identity in a Networked 
Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 283.
118 See generally Burkell et al, supra note 115.
119 See Calvert, Voyeur Nation, supra note 112 at 23; Jonathan M Metzl, “Voyeur Nation? Chang-
ing Definitions of Voyeurism, 1950–2004” (2004) 12:2 Harvard Rev Psychiatry 127.
120 Calvert, Voyeur Nation, supra note 112 at 23. 
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however, is immediately and obviously in tension with privacy — a ten-
sion noted by others including Alan Westin, who explicitly identifies mass 
media and reality TV as “voyeuristic threats to privacy.”121
We are obsessed with the intimate details of others’ lives: not only the 
lives of celebrities, but the lives of everyday people. The rise of “reality TV” 
is testament to this fact, and analysis of reality programming suggests that 
the appeal lies in overtly voyeuristic characteristics, including a “fly on 
the wall perspective,” where we can observe “private” settings and inter-
actions that often involve nudity, and/or gossip.122 Moreover, although 
audiences perceive a social stigma associated with watching reality TV, 
they persist in watching because it is enjoyable and a form of escapism.123 
It helps, of course, that reality TV can be consumed from the privacy of 
one’s home, and even from the screen of one’s computer. 
This same focus on personal (and sensational) information is evident 
in mass media (i.e. television, radio, and print news), and in this context 
we can specifically examine public interest in coverage of justice issues, in-
cluding trials. Media coverage of courtroom news offers the public a “dis-
embodied” view of court proceedings, in some ways analogous to the view 
afforded to the public when allowed online access to court records. In this 
context, what interests the public? What do we want to know about courts 
and court proceedings? Empirical evidence suggests that the educational 
component of open courts, at least as reflected in media coverage of court 
proceedings, is modest at best,124 although attention to high-profile court 
cases may promote public engagement in the form of interpersonal dis-
cussions about the legal system.125 “Newsworthy” cases are not necessarily 
or even commonly “legally important” cases — instead, the public attends 
121 Alan F Westin, “Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy” (2003) 59:2 J Social Issues 431 
at 432.
122 See generally Lemi Baruh, “Publicized Intimacies on Reality Television: An Analysis of 
Voyeuristic Content and its Contribution to the Appeal of Reality Programming” (2009) 
53:2 J Broadcasting & Electronic Media 190; June Deery, “Reality TV as Advertainment” 
(2004) 2:1 Popular Communication 1.
123 See Lisa K Lundy, Amanda M Ruth & Travis D Park, “Simply Irresistible: Reality TV Con-
sumption Patterns” (2008) 56:2 Communication Q 208.
124 See e.g. Herbert M Kritzer, “The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowl-
edge of Supreme Court” (2001) 85 Judicature 32.
125 See e.g. William J Brown, James J Duane & Benson P Fraser, “Media Coverage and Public 
Opinion of the OJ Simpson Trial: Implications for the Criminal Justice System” (1997) 2:2 
Comm L & Pol’y 261.
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to coverage of those cases that entertain rather than inform.126 Selective 
coverage has potentially negative consequences for public understanding 
of the law and legal proceedings, and for public perspectives on criminal 
justice policy.127 In Tabloid Justice, Fox and his co-authors examine news 
coverage of criminal justice matters. In general, the media have reflected 
and engaged public interest by covering cases “mostly as a means of en-
tertainment and enhanced ratings rather than as vehicles for public edu-
cation.”128 They characterize this coverage as “sensationalized”,129 focused 
on “status, personality, score-keeping and sex/violence titillation, rather 
than on legal rules, institutions, processes and context.”130 In general, sex-
based cases tend to be over-reported in the media, particularly if those 
cases are sensational or unusual.131 Families have difficulty protecting im-
ages of accidents and death from the public gaze.132 Thus, public interest 
in court cases reflects a voyeuristic focus on highly personal and often 
salacious material. Moreover, as a public we are not entirely comfortable 
with our own voyeuristic position, and some reflections on media cover-
age of courtroom trials suggest public disquiet at the intrusive and sensa-
tionalist nature of the media’s reporting of court proceedings.133
We would not discount the prospect that online access to court rec-
ords can and will facilitate access to information that will serve the open 
court principle’s underlying objectives by, for example, providing litigants 
with easier access to court files. However, we believe it is important to 
be cognizant of the privacy risks of general public access, particularly in 
126 See Daya Kishan Thussu, News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment (London, 
UK: Sage Publications, 2008).
127 See e.g. Sara Sun Beale, “The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How 
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness” (2006) 48:2 Wm & Mary L Rev 397.
128 Richard L Fox, Robert W Van Sickel & Thomas L Steiger, Tabloid Justice: Criminal Justice in 
an Age of Media Frenzy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001) at 55.
129 Ibid at 55.
130 Ibid at 1. 
131 See Kenneth Dowler, “Sex, Lies, and Videotape: The Presentation of Sex Crime in Local 
Television News” (2006) 34:4 J Criminal Justice 383.
132 See Clay Calvert, “A Familial Privacy Right over Death Images: Critiquing the Internet-pro-
pelled Emergence of a Nascent Constitutional Right That Preserves Happy Memories and 
Emotions” (2013) 40:3 Hastings Const LQ 475; Clay Calvert “The Privacy of Death: An 
Emergent Jurisprudence and Legal Rebuke to Media Exploitation and a Voyeuristic Cul-
ture” (2005–2006) 26:2 Loyola Los Angeles Entertainment L Rev 133. 
133 See Ronald Goldfarb, TV or Not TV: Television, Justice, and the Courts (New York: New 
York University Press, 1998) at 1–8 (for a discussion of pre-television publicity of trials); 
J Anthony Lukas, “Big Trouble: Celebrity Trials and the Good Old Days that Never Were” 
(1998) 12 Media Studies J 46.
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relation to the parties’ and witnesses’ personal information. Although we 
have no direct information on how and why members of the general pub-
lic access and use personal information in court documents online, media 
coverage provides a reasonable model. The evidence strongly suggests that 
this coverage satisfies a voyeuristic rather than educational function. Ex-
tending this principle to the realm of online court documents, this would 
suggest that the personal details included in those documents would, sim-
ilarly, be subject to a voyeuristic gaze.134 From this perspective, the inclu-
sion of personally identifiable and sensitive information in online court 
documents potentially places the voyeuristic value — rather than the open 
court principle — in tension with privacy. Moreover, the inclusion of per-
sonal information in online court documents raises particular and specific 
risks — including identity theft — for those whose information is exposed. 
In this section, we have argued that the exposure of personal information 
in online court documents heightens privacy concerns without advancing 
the goals of the open court principle — particularly education and public 
engagement. We therefore believe that in placing court documents online, 
we should take measures to enhance the privacy of parties and witnesses 
whose personal information is exposed in those documents. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite a core commitment to “open courts,” the principle is not univer-
sally enforced,135 the tension between open courts and privacy is widely 
acknowledged,136 and privacy interests are carefully considered as justifi-
134 Indeed, some have speculated that free-for-all access to court records online may not 
only generate embarrassment and undermine privacy, but also facilitate witness-litigant 
bullying and nourish an intimidation industry. See Karen Eltis, “The Judicial System in 
the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship Between Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber 
Context” (2011) 56:2 McGill LJ 289 at 301.
135 In fact, many democracies around the world, including many European countries (such 
as France and Spain), as well as Japan, take steps to anonymize cases to protect privacy. 
See e.g. Amanda Conley et al, “Sustaining Both Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition 
from Local to Online Access to Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry” (2012) 71:3 Md 
L Rev 773 at 840; Elena Larrauri, “Conviction Records in Spain: Obstacles to Reintegra-
tion of Offenders” (2011) 3:1 Eur J Probation 50, at 51–52, n11; Nicolas Vermeys, “Privacy v. 
Transparency: How Remote Access to Court Records Forces Us to Re-examine Our Fun-
damental Values” in Karim Benyehklef et al, eds, eAccess to Justice (Ottawa: University of 
Ottawa Press, 2016) 123. 
136 Policy Center for Victims Issues, Victim Privacy and the Open Court Principle, by Jamie 
Cameron (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2003).
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cation for requests to suppress names and other personal details in public-
ly available court documents. Nonetheless, this type of privacy protection 
remains the exception rather than the rule, and all aspects of court records, 
including identity and other personal information regarding parties and 
witnesses, remain presumptively open to the public. Justification for this 
position rests at least in part on the presumed positive effects of public 
access to this kind of information, although these presumptions merit fur-
ther interrogation even without the additional complications introduced 
when court information is made accessible online. The default position 
is to treat online publication of court records as a simple extension of ex-
isting access under open court principles, and therefore to publish online 
the same information that would be available through paper records. In 
this paper, we posit an alternative position. We suggest that public access 
to court records that include personal information, particularly when that 
access is online, supports privacy violations and possibly the voyeurism 
value,137 both of which are arguably unrelated (and even antithetical) to 
the open court principle and its underlying purposes. We describe a num-
ber of ways in which personal information contained in court documents 
can be used (legally or illegally) for financial gain at the expense of the 
personal privacy of the individuals involved, and suggest that public ac-
cess to the personal information contained in these documents may be 
just as likely to satisfy idle and salacious curiosity about parties and action, 
as it is to provide deep insight into the functioning of the legal system 
(which could be gained, in most instances, without having access to per-
sonal information about the parties and witnesses involved). Although 
privacy risks are raised by all forms of public access to unredacted court 
documents, we maintain that the risks are heightened in the online en-
vironment that affords “frictionless” information access: anonymous, free 
of geographic and temporal constraints, and largely invisible. “Friction-
less” access — coupled with the socially accepted voyeuristic gaze and the 
notion of information as entertainment — serve to increase the privacy 
risks of parties and witnesses whose personal information is exposed in 
online court documents, without substantially enhancing the goals of the 
open court principle. 
In our opinion, parties and witnesses involved in court proceedings bear 
unwarranted privacy risks as a result of online access to court information, 
137 Clay Calvert, “The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence” (1999) 17:2 Car-
dozo Arts & Ent LJ 273.
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and we agree with those who call for a greater level of privacy control for 
online access to court documents.138 Fortunately, the online environment 
presents a number of options for providing some degree of privacy protec-
tion vis-à-vis court documents.139 Hartzog and Stutzman140 offer practical 
suggestions for “online obscurity,” including restricting search visibility, 
protecting access to documents, and redacting identifying information. 
With respect to the latter, a number of bodies have recommended that 
sensitive personal information should be redacted from a variety of court 
records, including judgments.141 Other proposed methods include: taking a 
two-tiered approach by retaining the status quo for local access, but post-
ing only redacted versions online,142 and developing systems that allow for 
differential access, so that (for example) parties and authorized court per-
sonnel would have full access, while members of the public would have no 
or limited access.143 Differential access systems could incorporate formal 
request systems to allow for case-by-case access to otherwise restricted 
information for scholarly, journalistic, or statistical purposes.144 
While these recommendations have had limited effect, and indeed 
some argue that they are antithetical to open access principles, we feel 
that measures such as these are appropriate, and indeed necessary, for on-
line court records. New technologies may assist with the problem of limit-
ing the disclosure of sensitive personal information in online documents. 
Indeed, while redacting this information from paper documents presents 
138 See Caren Myers Morrison, “Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: To-
wards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records” 62:3 Vand L Rev 919.
139 See Conley et al, supra note 135 at 840.
140 Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D Stutzman, “Obscurity by Design” (2013) 88:2 Wash L Rev 
385.
141 For example, the Canadian Judicial Council recommended removal of personal data iden-
tifiers from judgments. See Judges’ Technology Advisory Committee, Use of Personal Infor-
mation in Judgments and Recommended Protocol (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, March 
2005), online: <www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_techissues_UseProtocol_ 
2005_en.pdf>. In addition, security breach laws in a number of states may require some 
courts in the United States to rethink inclusion of personal information in court records. 
See Susan Jennen Larson, “Court Record Access Policies: Under Pressure from State Secu-
rity Breach Laws?” United States, National Center for State Courts (Virginia: National Center 
for State Courts, 2006), online: <www.ncsc.org>. 
142 See Conley et al, supra note 135 at 843.
143 See ibid at 844; Peter Winn, “Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and 
Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information” (2004) 79:1 Wash L Rev 307 at 322–23 [Winn, 
“Online Court Records”].
144 See Lynn Sudbeck, “Placing Court Records Online: Balancing Judicial Accountability with 
Public Trust and Confidence” (2005) 27:3 Justice System J 268 at 282–83.
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a herculean task, with “born digital” documents (e.g., e-filed court docu-
ments) this management can be quite straightforward.145 It should be 
noted that our goal is not to preclude public access to the full information 
contained in court files — the open court principle demands that this in-
formation remain accessible. The object is simply to find new ways to en-
sure appropriate access and use,146 by introducing appropriate “friction” 
into the process of accessing court records.147 Reintroducing a level of fric-
tion may also have the beneficial effect of improving confidence in our 
public justice system. It may assist in preventing further development of a 
two-tiered system of justice by staunching the flow of generally economic-
ally advantaged actors into private alternative dispute resolution systems, 
while poor and middle classes are forced to forego accessing justice or 
face having intimate details of their lives made widely available online.148
It is important to note, as Chatterjee points out in her analysis of pri-
vacy in the family courts, that redacting personal information from court 
files will not necessarily protect the identity of parties.149 Given the pleth-
ora of non-identifying but nonetheless personal information available in 
court files, and in the context of the vast range of public records available, 
re-identification of anonymized information is increasingly possible.150 
This should not, however, trouble us — because the goal is not anonym-
ization of court records, which after all contain too much in the way of 
necessary and individual detail to support true anonymity. Instead, the 
goal should be simply to return a degree of practical obscurity to online 
court records, offering litigants and parties some version of the protection 
of their personal information that was afforded when the paper records 
were held in physical locations.151 Given the potential for voyeuristic in-
terest in and sensationalism around issues such as terrorism, drug use 
and addiction, and domestic violence, and the differential impact such 
145 See generally Gregory M Silverman, “Rise of the Machines: Justice Information Systems 
and the Question of Public Access to Court Records Over the Internet” (2004) 79:1 Wash 
L Rev 175.
146 See Peter A Winn, “Judicial Information Management in an Electronic Age: Old Standards, 
New Challenges” (2009) 3:2 Fed Cts L Rev 135.
147 See generally William McGeveran, “The Law of Friction” (2013) 2013:1 U Chicago Legal F 12.
148 See Winn, Online Court Records, supra note 143 at 328–29.
149 See Sujoy Chatterjee, “Balancing Privacy and the Open Court Principle in Family Law: 
Does De-Identifying Case Law Protect Anonymity?” (2014) 23 Dal J Leg Stud 91.
150 Paul Ohm, “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Ano-
nymization” (2010) 57 UCLA L Rev 1701.
151 See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, “The Case for Online Obscurity” (2013) 101:1 
Cal L Rev 1.
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publicity may have on Muslims,152 the mentally ill,153 the economically dis-
advantaged, and women,154 future research should focus on whether mech-
anisms to protect privacy in court records could also improve access to 
justice for equality-seeking groups. 
152 For example, a Concordia University graduate student who sued Transport Canada for his 
inclusion on the no-fly list was denied his request for anonymization, even as Transport 
Canada denied him access to evidence supporting their claim that he was an “immediate 
threat to aviation” security. See Adrian Humphreys, “First Man on Canada’s No-fly List 
Denied Legal Funding for Court Fight”, The National Post (4 January 2013), online: <www.
nationalpost.com>.
153 For further discussion of the impacts of open access to personally identifying information 
about the mentally ill who appear in Canadian courts. See Ian Mackenzie, “The Open 
Court Principle and Mental Health Stigma: What’s the Right Balance?” (6 January 2016), 
Slaw, online: <www.slaw.ca>.
154 See Safety Net Canada, Canadian Legal Remedies for Technology-enabled Violence Against 
Women (BC Society of Transition Houses: 2013) at 5–6, online: <www.bcsth.ca> (for fur-
ther discussion of the potentially devastating impacts that public access to sensitive case 
file information can have on women experiencing domestic violence).

